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Abstract:  
We show that the reported tendency for performance pay to be associated with greater 
wage inequality at the top of the earnings distribution applies only to white workers. This 
results in the white-black wage differential among those in performance pay jobs 
growing over the earnings distribution even as the same differential shrinks over the 
distribution for those not in performance pay jobs. We show this remains true even when 
examining suitable counterfactuals that hold observables constant between whites and 
blacks. We explore reasons behind our finding that performance pay is associated with 
greater racial earnings gaps at the top of the wage distribution focusing on the 
interactions between discrimination, unmeasured ability and selection. 
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1 Introduction
A major contribution of personnel economics has been to emphasize that performance pay helps
identify and sort workers by productivity as well as eliciting additional eﬀort and that, as a conse-
quence, it generates greater earnings dispersion within the ﬁrm (Lazear (2000), Barth, Bratsberg,
Haegeland and Raaum (2008)). On a broader scale, Lemieux, MacLeod and Parent (2009) argue
that performance pay provides a channel that translates underlying changes in returns to skill into
greater earnings inequality. They demonstrate that the growing incidence of performance pay com-
bined with a substantial increase in the return to skills in those jobs account for a quarter of the
growth in wage inequality over the 1980s and 1990s and nearly all of the wage inequality growth in
the upper quintile of earnings. Thus, as they suggest, performance pay could be accommodating the
growth in the underlying dispersion in marginal products generated by skill biased technical change
(Juhn, Murphy and Pierce (1993)).
In this paper we examine the same time period separately identifying the inﬂuence of performance
pay on the structure of black and white earnings in the United States. Our interest is whether or not
performance pay plays the same role for blacks and whites. We ﬁrst show that in both the March
Current Population Survey (CPS) and the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), the white-black
earnings gap in the private sector grows toward the top of the wage distribution. In approximately
the upper quintile, something is deﬁnitely "pulling" the white distribution but not that of blacks.
Focusing on the PSID which, unlike the CPS, has information on pay methods, we then show that
performance pay becomes increasingly common higher in the earnings distribution for whites but less
so for blacks. Moreover, performance pay dramatically stretches the distribution of wages for whites
but not for blacks. The consequences on the white-black wage diﬀerential are striking. Among those
not in performance pay jobs and controlling for composition eﬀects, the resulting "unexplained"
racial diﬀerential shrinks almost monotonically when moving up the earnings distribution reaching
essentially zero at the very top of the distribution. Among those in performance pay jobs, the
white-black wage diﬀerential roughly doubles over the course of the last quintile of the earnings
distribution reaching its largest at the very top of the distribution.
Whatever is pulling the white distribution at the top is thus intimately related to performance
pay. Reinforcing this pattern, the return to a performance pay job for blacks is smaller than for whites
and decreases precipitously in the top quintile of the black wage distribution. For whites, the return
to a performance pay job grows dramatically over the full range of the wage distribution. Possibly
reﬂecting these returns, we ﬁnd that high skill blacks appear far less likely to select performance pay
jobs than do high skill whites. In the ﬁnal section of the paper we provide additional evidence on
selection by exploiting the presence of both methods-of-pay questions as well as the Armed Forces
Qualifying Test in the 1979 cohort of the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY). We also
bring public sector workers into our analysis suggesting that diﬀerences in the wage structures of
the private and public sectors may contribute to the sharp increase in the white-black wage gap
at the top of the private sector distribution. Speciﬁcally, we show that while skilled whites appear
disproportionately in the private sector and its performance pay jobs, skilled blacks appear to remove
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themselves from the private sector into the more compressed wage structure of the public sector.
2 Discussion
Past evidence on the role of performance pay on earnings diﬀerentials is mixed. Recent empirical
tests suggest that performance pay reduces mean earnings diﬀerentials by gender (Heywood and
Jirjahn (2002), Jirjahn and Stephan (2004)) and by race (Heywood and O'Halloran (2005); Fang
and Heywood (2006)). Yet, Bronars and Moore (1995) ﬁnd that performance pay does not inﬂuence
racial earnings diﬀerentials and others argue that performance pay based on subjective evaluations
such as in a typical merit pay scheme actually increases the latitude for supervisory prejudice (Marta
and Town (2001)). Indeed, Heywood and O'Halloran (2006) show that workers receiving individual
annual bonuses tend to show larger racial earnings diﬀerentials than those receiving only time rates.
Moreover, even what appears to be formulaic and not subjective may allow ample managerial lat-
itude. Madden (2008) uses data from two large ﬁrms to show that male managers provide female
stockbrokers fewer "complementary inputs" (speciﬁcally, the quality of accounts managers distribute
to brokers) and that this explains their lower earnings from otherwise formulaic commission schemes.
Importantly, not all discrimination need arise from managerial preferences. If workers have
contact with customers, it can be the customers' preferences that generate racial earnings diﬀerences
(Kahn (1991), Holzer and Ihlanfeldt (1998)). Thus, workers receiving performance pay such as tips or
commissions may have earnings that reﬂect these preferences generating racial earnings diﬀerentials.
In short, the theory and evidence on the relationship between performance pay and racial earnings
diﬀerentials might best be described as inconclusive.
We contribute, in part, by recognizing that the inﬂuence of performance pay on racial earnings
diﬀerentials may be mischaracterized with a single mean estimate and that its inﬂuence may diﬀer
substantially across the earnings distribution. Performance pay may allow a better match between
marginal productivities and earnings and/or it may increase the extent to which race enters evalu-
ations and so pay. There is no reason to anticipate that either of these takes place uniformly across
the earnings distribution yet previous examinations have been limited to only mean wage diﬀer-
entials. As an illustration, one might anticipate that the performance pay schemes at the bottom
of the earnings distribution tend to be more objective as in a simple piece rate while schemes at
the top of the distribution tend to involve a broader but more subjective performance appraisal as
in merit bonuses. Formulaic schemes are recognized as inappropriate when workers have multiple
tasks and task dimensions as they are generate adverse specialization, the tendency of workers to
over-specialize in those tasks providing the greatest rewards relative to eﬀort costs (Baker (1992),
MacDonald and Marx (2001)). Thus, in empirical evidence, the alternative of a comprehensive per-
formance appraisal becomes more likely when jobs are complex and involve many tasks (Brown and
Heywood (2005)). While this appraisal potentially provides a more accurate assessment of perfor-
mance for those higher in the earnings distribution, it also runs the risk of giving greater latitude
to prejudice. Indeed, in his examination of a large white-collar employer, Castilla (2008) shows not
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only that race inﬂuences appraisal ratings but that whites receive larger raises than blacks for equal
ratings. Castilla contends that this performance-reward bias persists because of agency problems
created by limited transparency and accountability within the ﬁrm and argues that given these con-
ditions merit pay designed to ensure meritocracy can actually increase the role of prejudice in pay
determination.1
Our result that among non-performance pay jobs the white-black earnings diﬀerential declines
over the distribution of earnings certainly ﬁts with received knowledge. Lang (2007) summarizes
this knowledge by saying "if there is discrimination in the labor market, it is concentrated at the
lower end of the skill distribution. Black and white male college graduates have similar earnings."
Moreover, in their work on the role of pre-market skills (as measured by the AFQT), Johnson and
Neal (1996) and Johnson and Neal (1998) show that among those with scores more than one standard
deviation above the mean, the black white diﬀerence in annual earnings for men falls to only ﬁve
percent.2
Despite these general patterns, there remains emphasis on examining racial diﬀerences at the
top of the distribution. This emphasis comes both from studies on racial earnings diﬀerences among
the highly educated and from studies of the change in overall inequality. Among the former, Black,
Haviland, Sanders and Taylor (2006) share a concern about pre-market factors but limit their ex-
amination to the college educated. They control for parent's educational attainment, for highest
degree, for English language usage and for highly detailed measures of the ﬁeld of highest degree.
Using nonparametric matching techniques they ﬁnd that that they can explain virtually all of the
wage gaps between white men and Hispanic men and Asian men. Importantly, the same does not
hold true for blacks. While they can ﬁnd a near zero diﬀerence for black men with college-educated
parents not born in the South, white-black diﬀerentials remain signiﬁcant and often double digit for
other college educated black males. In earlier work, Weinberger (1998) also examines the college
educated controlling for detailed ﬁeld of study, GPA and the exact institution attended. She reports
a signiﬁcant double-digit diﬀerential between black and white males and in related work suggests
that the racial diﬀerential for the college educated has been largely stable over the 1980s and 1990s
(Weinberger and Joy (2007)). Thus, while diﬀerentials may be larger among the less skilled, there
remains concern that they also persist at the top of the distribution.3
Studies of the growth of inequality have emphasized the consequences on white-black earnings
diﬀerentials. While Card and Lemieux (1994) cast doubt on a general connection between changing
returns to skills and white-black wage diﬀerentials, Juhn, Murphy and Pierce (1991) and Card
and Lemieux (1995) ﬁnd that changes in skill prices reduced the earnings of blacks relative to
whites. Reardon (1997) shows that the general inequality story of skill biased technical change may
1See MacLeod (2003) for a formal agency model with subjective evaluation in which prejudice is introduced.
2Although the Johnson and Neal (1998) are quick to emphasize that only ﬁve percent of black men in their sample
score more than one standard deviation above the mean.
3We note that racial earnings diﬀerentials may be biased by the greater tendency of blacks to be among those with
low earnings potential and so drop out of the labor force (Brown (1984), Neal (2004)). As this tendency is more muted
at the top of the skills distribution, it is unlikely to greatly inﬂuence our ﬁnding of a large increase in the white-black
diﬀerential over the last quintile for those on performance pay.
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be particularly important in explaining racial inequality growth among highly skilled blacks and
whites. Similarly, Rogers (2006) shows that the stretching (increased variance of wages) of the skill
distribution during the 1980s explains the growth in within group white-black wage gaps at the
top of that distribution. Related work by Bound and Freeman (1992) and by Chay and Lee (2000)
document a widening in the black white earnings diﬀerential for young men over the 1980s and
show that it was largest among the college educated.4 The critical point to take away is that there
remains interest in the white-black earnings diﬀerential among the highly skilled and that there
exists a suggestion that increasing inequality may have an inﬂuence on that diﬀerential even if not
on the diﬀerential in general.
Here we add value by showing that the method of pay is crucial in exploring these questions. The
stretching of the white distribution relative to the black earnings distribution happens exclusively
among those in performance pay jobs. Indeed, the white-black earnings diﬀerential grows over the
distribution of earnings and is largest at the top of the distribution among those on performance
pay jobs. Thus, for workers in performance pay jobs the summary provided by Lang (2007) seems
inappropriate even as it correctly summarizes those not in performance pay jobs. Among those in
performance pay jobs, the white-black earnings gap is largest at the top of the distribution. Among
those in jobs without performance pay, the white-black earnings gap is largest at the bottom of the
distribution.
Finally, we contribute to the evidence that performance pay causes ability sorting. In their case
studies, Lazear (2000), Banker, Lee and Srinivasan (2000), and Sorensen and Grytten (2003) each
ﬁnd that sorting generates a large share (from one-third to more than half) of the productivity
increase associated with performance pay. More generally, Curme and Stefanec (2007) show that
workers on performance pay have higher standardized test scores, higher self-esteem and less fatalistic
attitudes than do otherwise equal workers on time rates. Experiments conﬁrm that those with greater
risk tolerance, higher ability and more conﬁdence tend to choose a performance pay scheme in the
laboratory Dohmen and Falk (2001). While it seems clear from the literature that workers sort
into performance pay to capture an ability rent, racial diﬀerences in this tendency have not been
explored. As part of our discussion, we present evidence that such sorting is strongly present for
white workers but far less common, perhaps absent, for black workers.
3 Setting the Stage
To motivate our main analysis which makes use of the PSID, we ﬁrst show the variation in the raw
log wage diﬀerential between blacks and whites across the wage distribution using the March Current
Population Survey for the years 1976-1999. The hourly earnings measure derived from the March
CPS, total annual earnings divided by annual hours worked, both for the previous calendar year,
follows the same construction as the wage measure we use in the PSID. In principle, it should include
all components of earnings, including variable pay components such as bonuses, commissions, etc.
4Couch and Daly (2002) identify a shrinking in the white-black wage gap over the 1990s but show that the decline
was tempered by the changes in general inequality.
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We show the white-black wage gap using the March CPS to demonstrate that the pattern observed
in the PSID is not simply an artifact of that much smaller data set.5
Note that all the gaps shown in the ﬁgures below are obtained by ﬁrst regressing the log wage on
a set of year dummies for employed individuals whose main job in the previous calendar year was in
the private sector in order to net out yearly variations (although whether we do this or not makes
no qualitative diﬀerence). We use the residuals of those regressions as our hourly wage measure.
As shown in Figure 1, the racial wage gap increases almost monotonically across the wage
distribution. However, starting at approximately the 85th percentile, the white-black gap increases
sharply. Clearly something is pulling the white wage distribution at the top but not the black
wage distribution.
Next we perform the same exercise using the PSID, exploiting the fact that one of the two
wage measures available in that data set corresponds to the one present in the March CPS, namely
annual earnings divided by annual hours of work over the previous calendar year. The other is a
time-of-the-interview wage measure. As can seen, the resulting Figure 2 is visually similar to Figure
1 although the gap shown in Figure 2 at the top end is even bigger than its corresponding value in
Figure 1, and the gap measured using March CPS does not drop markedly between the 45th and
85th percentiles, as it does in Figure 2.
One of the initial goals of this paper is to show that the sharply increasing white-black wage gap
at the top of the hourly earnings distribution computed using the March CPS-like measure is driven
entirely by performance pay. Once we divide jobs into performance pay jobs and non performance
pay jobs, we show that the white-black wage gap in non performance pay jobs actually decreases
monotonically through most of the distribution. The next step is then to perform a counterfactual
analysis to decompose the observed wage gap into a part that results from compositional eﬀects
and a part that results from wage structure eﬀects. We also make use of a new unconditional
quantile decomposition technique to assess the role played by key explanatory variables in both the
compositional and the wage structure eﬀects. We then follow with an extended discussion of the
possible mechanisms underlying the relationship between wages and performance pay for white and
black workers.
4 Data
The bulk of our analysis is conducted using data from the PSID. The main advantage of the PSID is
that it provides a representative sample of the workforce for a relatively long time period, essential
for studying the eﬀect of performance pay on wage inequality. One disadvantage of the PSID is that
our constructed measures of performance pay are relatively crude for reasons discussed below. We
also provide additional evidence using the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY).
5We use individuals whose main job in the previous calendar year was in the private sector. Self-employed workers
are deleted. We keep wage observations ranging from $1.50 to $100.00 in $1979.
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4.1 The Panel Study of Income Dynamics (1976-1998)
The PSID sample we use consists of male heads of households aged 18 to 65 with average hourly
earnings between $1.50 and $100.00 (in 1979 dollars) for the years 1976-1998, where the hourly wage
rate is obtained by dividing total labor earnings by total hours of work, both reported retrospectively
for the previous calendar year.67 Again, given our focus on performance pay, this wage measure
based on total yearly earnings, inclusive of performance pay, is preferable to point-in-time wage
measures that would likely miss infrequent payments (e.g. bonuses) of performance pay.
Individuals who are self-employed are excluded from the analysis since our measure of perfor-
mance pay based on receiving bonuses, commissions, or piece-rates is deﬁned for employed workers
only. For the moment we also exclude workers from the public sector since it is not clear what it
means to pay workers for their productivity in a sector where employment and wage setting decisions
are not based on proﬁt maximization. At the end of the paper, we bring public sector workers into
the analysis to investigate possible connections between the respective wage structures of the private
and public sectors. This leaves us with a total sample of 25,258 observations (6,928 for 896 black
workers and 18,330 for 2012 white workers) for 3,053 workers. All estimates reported in the paper
are weighted using the PSID sample weights. Note that we pool together all the observations for
the 1976-1998 period when we perform our analysis of the white-black wage gap. Given that we are
performing a distributional analysis, we need a reasonably large number of observations and cutting
the data into separate time-periods to study possible changes over time would result in dramatically
reducing the number of wage observations being used for each sub-period. Nevertheless, we can still
gain insight into the evolution of the process determining white-black wage diﬀerentials when we use
the NLSY at the end of the results section.
4.1.1 Identifying Performance Pay in the PSID8
We construct a performance-pay indicator by identifying whether or not a worker's total compensa-
tion includes a variable pay component (bonus, commission, or piece-rate). For all interview years
we are able to determine whether a worker received a bonus or a commission over the previous calen-
dar year through the use of multiple questions. First, workers are asked the amount of money they
6In the PSID, data on hours worked during year t, as well as on total labor earnings, bonuses/commissions/overtime
income, and overtime hours, are asked in interview year t+1. Thus we actually use data covering interview years
1976-1999. Annual earnings were top coded at $99,999 until 1982 (and not top coded since then), but only a handful
of individuals were at the top code. We trim very high values of wages (above $100.00 in 1979 dollars) but do not
otherwise adjust for top coding.
7Our focus on male heads of households stems from the fact that only heads are asked about their income derived
from bonuses, commissions, or overtime. In the PSID, males are designated as the head in all husband-wife pairs. The
same is true if the female has a boyfriend with whom she has been living for at least a year, even if the female is the
person with the most ﬁnancial responsibility in the family unit. Consequently, the sample of female heads is relatively
small. Using the same sample selection criteria as the ones we use for males would leave us with 1,367 females for a
total of 8,185 observations. Perhaps more importantly, issues of representativeness would arise as those female heads
are disproportionately black (24.4 percent) and are much less likely to be married (9.2 percent).
8In this and the next subsection we provide the essential information underlying the identiﬁcation and construction
of our performance pay measure. Readers are referred to Lemieux, MacLeod and Parent (2009) for the full details.
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received from working overtime, from commissions, or from bonuses paid by the employer.9 Second,
we sometimes know only whether or not workers worked overtime, and if they are working overtime
in a given year, not the amount of pay they received for overtime. Thus, we classify workers as not
having had a variable pay component if they worked overtime. Third, workers not paid exclusively
by the hour, or not exclusively by a salary, are asked how they are paid: they can report being paid
commissions, piece-rates, etc., as well as a combination of salaried/hourly pay along with piece-rates,
bonuses or commissions. Through this combination of questions, we are thus able to identify all
non-overtime workers who received performance pay in bonus, commission, or piece-rate form.
One obvious drawback is that the performance-pay component we construct will likely be noisy
for hourly workers, though not for salaried workers who are not eligible for overtime payments. How-
ever, due to our treatment of overtime workers, we conservatively lean on the side of misclassifying
workers as receiving no performance pay even when they do.
4.1.2 Deﬁning Performance-pay Jobs
We deﬁne performance-pay jobs as employment relationships in which part of the worker's total
compensation includes a variable pay component (bonus, a commission, piece-rate) at least once
during the course of the relationship.10 Since we use actual payments of bonuses, commissions or
piece rates to identify performance-pay jobs, we are likely to misclassify performance-pay jobs as non-
performance-pay jobs if some employment relationships are either terminated before performance
pay is received, or partly unobserved for being out of our sample range. This source of measurement
error is problematic because of an end-point problem in the PSID data. Given our deﬁnition of
performance-pay jobs, we may mechanically understate the fraction of workers in such jobs at the
beginning of our sample period because most employment relationships observed in 1976 started
before 1976, and we do not observe whether or not performance pay was received prior to 1976.
Similarly, jobs that started toward the end of the sample period may be performance-pay jobs but
are classiﬁed otherwise because they have not lasted long enough for performance pay to be observed.
The problem is that, conditional on job duration, we tend to observe a given job match fewer
times at the two ends of our sample period than in the middle of the sample. Consider, for example,
the case of a job that lasts for ﬁve years. For jobs that last from 1985 to 1989, all ﬁve observations
on this job match are captured in our PSID sample. For jobs that last from 1973 to 1977, however,
only two of the ﬁve years of the job match are observed, which mechanically reduces the probability
of classifying the job as one with performance pay.
Because of this end-point problem, we get an unbalanced distribution of the number of times
job matches are observed at diﬀerent points of the sample period. To provide a solution to this
problem we adjust measures of the incidence of performance pay over time by estimating a linear
9Note that the question refers speciﬁcally to any amounts earned from bonuses, overtime, or commissions in
addition to wages and salaries earned.
10We use jobs, employment relationship, and job match interchangeably. Given that simply determining tenure
with the same employer is not problem-free when using the PSID (Brown and Light (1992)), we abstain from using
the information on tenure in the same position in the ﬁrm.
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probability model in which dummies for calendar years and for the number of times the job-match
is observed are included as regressors (estimating a logit gave almost identical results). We then
compute an adjusted measure of the incidence of performance pay by holding the distribution of the
number of times the job-match is observed to its average value for the years 1982 to 1990, which
are relatively unaﬀected by the end-point problem. Misclassiﬁcation errors also have implications
for the measured wage gap by type of jobs. More on that in the results section.
.
4.2 Descriptive Analysis
In Table 1 we report sample mean statistics for both types of jobs by race. While wages are over 31%
higher on average for whites in performance pay jobs than in non performance pay jobs, for blacks
the diﬀerence is around 12%. This stands as the ﬁrst indication that the inﬂuence of performance pay
jobs may diﬀer by race. Also, potential experience is somewhat smaller for blacks in performance
pay jobs, although the diﬀerence is largely due to blacks being younger in performance pay jobs
relative to whites. Another signiﬁcant diﬀerence between whites and blacks is the change in the
fraction of workers paid by the hour as one moves from non performance pay jobs to performance
pay jobs. The increase in the percentage of white workers paid a salary in performance pay jobs
is not mirrored for blacks, who are also much more likely than whites to be covered by a collective
bargaining agreement regardless of the type of job. Both white and blacks workers in performance
pay job workers are more educated and also work more annual hours than those in jobs without
performance pay.
Unlike the NLSY, the PSID does not have a direct measure of achievement like the AFQT score
but it does have information on family background. Johnson and Neal (1996) show that family
background variables (parental education and occupational status) explain a signiﬁcant fraction-
although by no means all-of the AFQT score. As shown in Table 1, individuals in performance
pay jobs tend to come from families in which parents are more educated and also more likely to be
in well-paid white collar occupations. However, and this will turn out to be important later when
discussing diﬀerences between blacks and whites in terms of the selection process into performance
pay jobs, the positive association between family background and performance pay jobs is more
obvious in the case of white workers.
In Figure 3 we plot the incidence of performance pay jobs for whites and blacks by year (adjusted
for the end-point problem mentioned above). White workers are clearly more likely to be in such
jobs than black workers. Note, though, that the incidence for black workers increased sharply in the
early 80's and has since been roughly parallel to the incidence for whites. Figure 4 shows where the
discrepancy in incidence occurs in terms of location in the wage distribution. The black and white
incidence of a performance pay job are more nearly similar in the bottom half of the distribution.
The whites' incidence rises at an increasing rate from the middle to the top of the distribution while
the increase at the top is considerably more modest for blacks. If performance pay jobs have an
inequality enhancing eﬀect, it is clear from Figure 4 that those jobs cannot be as signiﬁcant a factor
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in explaining changes in inequality at the top of the black wage distribution as it is for whites.
The next set of ﬁgures show kernel density estimates of the wage distributions for both races of
workers in both types of jobs. In Figures 5 and 6 we compare whites and blacks within the same
job types whereas in Figures 7 and 8 we compare the wage distributions across job types within
racial groups. Looking ﬁrst at Figures 5 and 6 two things stand out. First, blacks are on average
paid less regardless of whether they are in performance-pay jobs or not. Second, the black wage
distribution in performance pay-jobs is twin-peaked, suggesting that black workers at both ends
of the distribution are much more likely to be pulled (or pushed) into performance pay jobs relative
to whites. We should emphasize that we are simply plotting the observed wages without any sort
of adjustment for the fact that the composition of the workforce might be very diﬀerent across jobs
and that such composition eﬀects may be quite diﬀerent for blacks relative to whites. In the next
section, after outlining the methods used to perform such adjustments for diﬀerences in observables,
we will show the adjusted distributions.
In Figures 7 and 8 we easily see that while white workers are paid more in performance pay
jobs, the same cannot be readily observed for blacks. In addition, the inequality-enhancing eﬀect
of performance pay (whether through selection or incentive eﬀects or a combination) is visually
more obvious for whites. Speciﬁcally, there is little visual evidence that blacks at the top of the
performance pay job wage distribution are paid more than at the corresponding position in non
performance pay jobs.
Turning to the white-black wage gap by percentile, Figure 9 shows that the raw gap for perfor-
mance pay jobs actually exceeds that for non-performance pay jobs everywhere except in the bottom
percentiles where the gaps are essentially the same. The gap in performance pay jobs follows a mild
inverted U shape until about the 80th percentile before rising sharply at the top end of the wage
distribution. The contrast is striking when compared to non performance pay jobs where the white-
black wage gap basically decreases throughout. In fact, the performance pay job white-black wage
gap is the largest at the very top while the gap in non performance pay jobs is the smallest at the
top end. Figure 9 strongly suggests that the increase in the white-black wage gap at the top end
shown using the March Current Population Survey is driven entirely by performance pay.
Figure 10 shows striking diﬀerences in wage diﬀerentials between types of jobs within racial
groups. For whites, the performance pay job premium is roughly constant until one reaches the 60th
percentile, after which it rises in a convex fashion. For blacks the pattern is very diﬀerent: the gap
decreases until the 50th percentile, at which point blacks are paid roughly the same in either type
of job. The gap then moves up only to fall dramatically over the last quintile. These ﬁgures make
clear that performance pay is associated with stretching the wage distribution for white workers
at the top relative to what happens to workers in non performance pay jobs and that this is simply
not true for black workers. For whatever reason, performance pay does not appear to a play the
inequality enhancing role at the top of the black wage distribution that it does for whites. Again,
given the purely descriptive nature of these ﬁgures, it is not clear at this point whether the lack
of inequality enhancing eﬀects for blacks results merely from diﬀerent selection eﬀects relative to
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whites or from true wage structure eﬀects. We turn to these compositional issues next.
5 Adjusting for Composition Eﬀects
To account for the fact that the distribution of observable characteristics may be very diﬀerent across
both races and job types, we make use of an extension of the methodology developed in DiNardo
et al. (1996) (henceforth DFL). Given the nature of our problem, namely the analysis of wage gaps
between two groups of workers observed in either performance or non performance pay jobs, we need
to extend the DFL method to allow for the additional dimension of choice (types of jobs). Details
of the DFL methodology and the extension we use are relegated to Appendix 1. Note also that
throughout we reweight the wage distribution of white workers to make it similar to that of blacks.
We do not perform the reverse exercise of reweighting the black distribution to make it look like the
white distribution. Although equally valid in principle, we would face a common support problem
similar to that in Barsky, Bound, Charles and Lupton (2002) in their analysis of the relationship
between wealth and earnings for blacks and whites: although it is not diﬃcult to ﬁnd white workers
comparable to blacks at any point of support of the distribution of X ′s for blacks, it is more diﬃcult
to ﬁnd black workers who are comparable to whites at the top end.11
In Figures 11 and 12 we reproduce the wage gaps shown in Figure 9 except that we adjust for
composition eﬀects by reweighting the distributions of wages in both types of jobs such that the
distribution of observables for white workers is the same as that for black workers. Note that we
show two counterfactuals, one without parental education and father's occupational status and one
including them. As mentioned earlier, Johnson and Neal (1996) show that those family background
variables can account for a substantial fraction (up to 30%) of the white-black gap in AFQT scores.
Assuming selection on ability, one would expect those controls to play a substantial role, possibly
more so in performance pay jobs than in non performance pay jobs, as the former are by nature
designed to tailor compensation more closely to productive ability.
Quite clearly, composition eﬀects matter in both types of jobs. In fact, after controlling for
composition, the racial wage gap in the top half of the non performance pay job wage distribution
appears largely absent. This is particularly true once we control for family background variables.
And while there is still a sizable gap in performance pay jobs the role of composition at top is
nevertheless quite large. In fact, roughly 65% of the raw wage gap at the top end of the wage
distribution for performance pay job workers is due to composition eﬀects. In addition, the gap is
less than 10% when controlling for family background between roughly the 70th and 85th percentiles.
Yet, in the top 15% we observe a very sharp increase back to above 30%.
Somewhat surprisingly, there is little evidence that family background plays a larger role in
explaining the gap in performance pay jobs than in non performance pay jobs. Given that our
11For example while the range in years of education is the same for both whites and blacks there are few blacks
with 16 or more years of education in performance pay jobs (231 observations) relative to whites (2224) but a lot
of observations for those with just a high school degree (1218 for blacks and 3254 for whites). Add to this that the
support is multidimensional (e.g. workers with 17 years of education in management positions in the ﬁnancial sector),
and the comparability problem gets compounded.
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counterfactuals are based on making whites look like blacks in terms of observables, this is suggestive
that selectivity into performance pay jobs based on ability may not be nearly as pronounced for blacks
as it is for whites. One way to check this conjecture more directly is to recompute the wage gap
between performance pay job workers and other workers by race, as shown in Figures 10, but this
time controlling for composition by adjusting the distribution of observed characteristics of workers
in performance pay jobs such that it matches that of workers in non performance pay jobs. The
result of that exercise is reported in Figures 13A,B. Looking ﬁrst at the actual vs the counterfactual
wage gaps for black workers we can see that while composition eﬀects matter over a wide range
of the wage distributions, once we reach the very top there is little evidence that black workers in
performance pay jobs are much diﬀerent along observable dimensions than those in non performance
pay jobs. The same cannot be said of white workers, as we can see in Panel B of Figure 13. For
white workers, composition eﬀects are roughly of the same magnitude throughout the distribution.
Coming back to Figures 11 and 12, there appears to be some evidence that composition eﬀects
increasingly matter relative to wage structure eﬀects (the part of the wage gaps left unexplained
by adjusting for observables) in the case of performance pay jobs, but not for non performance
pay jobs. To see this more directly, in Figure 14 we plot 95% conﬁdence intervals of both the
composition as well as the wage structure eﬀects resulting from the DFL decomposition, again by
percentiles of the respective wage distributions in each type of jobs. Although wage structure eﬀects
are more important than composition eﬀects in the low-to-middle quantiles of the wage distribution
for performance pay jobs, the relative importance of composition eﬀects increases dramatically as we
move toward the top once family background variables are included. For non performance pay jobs,
not surprisingly, there isn't any role left for wage structure eﬀects once we get beyond the middle
of the distribution. In addition the relative contribution of composition eﬀects is roughly constant
whether we include family background variables or not.
The upshot we take from Figures 11 and 13A,B is that, for some reason, the ability of performance
pay jobs to stretch the distribution at the the top end through a wage structure eﬀect, one of
the key results in Lemieux, MacLeod and Parent (2009), is essentially a whites-only phenomenon.
There is little evidence of an inequality-enhancing eﬀect of performance pay for blacks at the top of
the distribution. One reason suggested from Figures 13A, B is that the black skill distribution in
performance pay jobs and non performance pay jobs is roughly similar at the top end of the earnings
distribution while they diﬀer dramatically for white workers.
6 Which Variables Matter More in Generating the Composition
and Wage Structure Eﬀects?
Having computed both parts of the total wage gap, we now examine which variables or set of variables
explain the composition and the wage structure eﬀects. Although parsing out the inﬂuence of each
observable characteristic is straightforward to do in the case of means using the usual Blinder-Oaxaca
decomposition, until recently the same could not be said in the case of other distributional statistics
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of interest such as the median wage gap.
6.1 An Unconditional Quantile Regression Approach to Assess the Eﬀect of
Observables
One key feature of the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition method is that one can average out the
conditional-on-X wage gaps by the law of iterated expectations, and thus get a population param-
eter, i.e. E(E(Y |X)) = E(Y ). If one is interested in wage gaps at various quantiles of the wage
distribution, this averaging out property does not hold. For example, the expectation of the condi-
tional median (or of any other quantile) does not produce the median of the marginal distribution.
Consequently, using standard conditional quantile regressions to examine the eﬀect of covariates at
diﬀerent quantiles does not allow to recover the unconditional (in the sense of having integrated
out the X ′s) parameter of interest. A new procedure proposed in Firpo, Fortin and Lemieux (2007)
(FFL) provides a method for computing such unconditional quantiles and provides estimates of the
eﬀects of each individual covariate at diﬀerent parts of the wage distribution. Their method rests
on using the inﬂuence function as the dependent variable in a linear regression framework.12 In the
case of a quantile q(τ), its recentered inﬂuence function RIFi for observation wi is given by
RIFi = q(τ) +
[1((wi ≥ q(τ))− (1− τ)]
f(q(τ))
where f() is the density and 1() is the indicator for whether the wage observation is at or above
the quantile q(τ). The idea of recentering the RIF by adding q(τ) is simply that since E([1((wi ≥
q(τ)) − (1 − τ)]) = 0, the expected value of the recentered RIF will be q(τ) itself. FFL show that
this zero-expectation property extends to the conditional-on-X RIF . Thus, in practice, running a
regression of RIFi on Xi amounts to running a linear probability model for whether the observed
wage is above the quantile of interest. The only diﬀerence with the linear probability model is that
the coeﬃcients need to be divided by the density evaluated at that quantile.13
Although readers are referred to the paper by Firpo, Fortin and Lemieux (2007) for details,
Figure A1, based on a similar one in Boudarbat and Lemieux (2007) provides the intuition behind
the procedure. Suppose one is interested in the median wage gap between whites and blacks.
Note that while standard procedures cannot be used to decompose the median wage gap, it is
straightforward to decompose the probability gap Prob(B)− Prob(W ), where Prob(W ) represents
the fraction of white workers earnings less than than the median for blacks q(.5)_B, by running
a linear probability model for the probability that the wage observation is above q(.5)_B for each
group. The picture makes clear, though, that there is a connection between the probability gap and
quantile gap q(.5)_W − q(.5)_B. In fact the ratio of the two is simply the slope of the cumulative
12The inﬂuence function provides a measure of how robust a distributional statistic is to outlier observations. For
example, in the case of the mean µ = E(Yi) the inﬂuence function is Yi − µ.
13The FFL decomposition procedure, which is based on providing a linear approximation to a non-linear functional
of the distribution, only provides a ﬁrst-order approximation to the true composition eﬀects, irrespective of whether
one uses a linear probability model or not. Consequently, the extent to which the approximation is imperfect (including
the choice of the linear probability model) will be reﬂected in the approximation error. We report those below.
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distribution function-the density. Hence one can transform the probability gap into a quantile gap
by dividing the linear probability model coeﬃcients throughout by an estimate of the density.
In comparing the wage distributions of whites and blacks in performance pay jobs (for example),
we ﬁrst reweight the distribution of workers in one group to control for composition. This ﬁrst step
allows us to separate composition eﬀects from wage structure eﬀects. In the second step, we use
the recentered inﬂuence function regression approach to obtain the contribution of each covariate to
both the composition and the wage structure eﬀects.
To ﬁx ideas, consider the observed median wage gap between whites (W ) and blacks (B) in
performance pay jobs:
∆.5 ≡ qW (.5)− qB(.5)
By using the extended DiNardo, Fortin and Lemieux (1996) reweighting methodology, one can
construct a counterfactual wage distribution, for example the distribution of wages for white workers
in performance pay jobs if they had the same distribution of characteristics as blacks. This provides
us with a counterfactual median wage qc(.5):
∆.5 = (qW (.5)− qC(.5)) + (qC(.5)− qB(.5)) (1)
The ﬁrst pair of terms gives the part of the wage gap due to composition eﬀects (the white
workers' return to skill function is held constant) white the second pair provides us with the wage
structure eﬀect (the X's are held constant but not the returns to skill functions). Labelling the part
due to composition ∆X and the part due to wage structure eﬀects ∆g we thus have:
∆.5 = ∆X.5 + ∆
g
.5
Given this breakdown of the overall wage gap, we then use the recentered inﬂuence function
regressions to further allocate the composition and the wage structure eﬀects to each individual
covariate. In practice, for each quantile τ of interest this simply amounts to:
1. Run separate RIF regressions for qW (τ), qC(τ), and qB(τ).
2. Perform the usual Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition for each part of the wage gap measured at
various quantiles. For example, in the case of the median wage gap represented by equation(1),
one decomposition is performed for ∆X.5 and another for ∆
g
.5.
6.2 Results
6.2.1 Workers in Performance Pay Jobs
In Table 2 we report the results from the FFL decomposition of the white-black wage gap outlined
above. Note that we report only the results from the Blinder-Oaxaca exercise which is based on the
coeﬃcients of the RIF regressions, and not the RIF regression coeﬃcients themselves, unless speciﬁc
ones are worth discussing. For example, the overall composition eﬀect in performance pay jobs at
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the median is allocated to the various X's by using the β′s estimated for whites and multiplying
those by the diﬀerence in the average value of each corresponding X between the actual values and
the counterfactual values for whites. As for the wage structure eﬀect, we use the diﬀerence in β′s
between whites and blacks and multiply by the average of the corresponding X ′s for blacks.
We show two sets of results in Table 2, one set without the variables related to family background
and the other including it. One unappealing feature of any decomposition, whether it is the usual
Blinder-Oaxaca or the DFL methodology, is the strong assumption of selection on observables. This
is perhaps even more of an issue in the case of performance pay. The idea of leaving out and then
including family background variables is to see whether the results are qualitatively aﬀected by the
addition of those markers of some of the unmeasured dimensions of the workers. As we will see
below, including family background does allow us to attribute a bigger share of the observed wage
gap to composition eﬀects at the expense of wage structure eﬀects, thus indicating that unmeasured
ability does matter in determining who is observed in performance pay jobs. Yet, adding family
background controls does not result in reversing any of the conclusions that could be drawn from
performing the decomposition without including them.
Looking ﬁrst at Panel A of Table 2, it is clear that diﬀerences in educational attainment play a
substantial role in explaining the white-black wage in performance pay jobs. In fact, having more
education plays an increasingly larger role as we move towards the top of the distribution. This is
true whether or not we control for family background. For example, at the 95th percentile having at
least a B.A. degree can account for roughly 65% of the total composition eﬀect whereas it accounts
for less than 50% of it in the bottom half of the distribution. In addition, having parents with a
B.A. degree or more also matters more at the top than at the bottom. This is particularly true
in the case of mothers having a B.A. degree or more. Somewhat surprisingly, the role of having a
father who was/is either a professional or a manager is more ambiguous. In fact, at the top it goes
in the opposite direction relative to what one might expect if these occupational categories marked
more favorable backgrounds.
In terms of the accuracy of the linear approximation, from the approximation error reported at
the bottom of the panel we can see that between 68 and 98 percent of the total composition eﬀect
is accounted for by the model (in absolute value).
Turning to wage structure eﬀects (the β′s) shown in Panel B of Table 2, the results show that
diﬀerences in the returns to education and experience play a much larger role as we reach the top
of the black and white wage distributions. In fact the magnitude of the eﬀects is so large that it
overexplains the diﬀerences by a substantial margin. This overshooting is to a large extent oﬀset by
the diﬀerences in the contribution to the wage structure eﬀects of the local unemployment rate on the
wages of blacks and whites at the top of the distribution.14 Recall that the diﬀerential eﬀects of the
county unemployment rate is computed as the diﬀerence between the coeﬃcients associated to the
unemployment rate between white workers and black workers times the average unemployment rate
14Note that leaving out the unemployment rate does not make a qualitative diﬀerence to the magnitude of the
coeﬃcients associated to the other covariates except for the regression constant. Similarly, leaving out all the other
covariates does not qualitatively change the magnitude of the impact of the unemployment rate.
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for blacks in performance pay jobs. For example, the coeﬃcient of the RIF regression estimated at
the 95th percentile is -0.0581 for whites compared 0.0061 for blacks. Hence the wages of black workers
in performance pay jobs are much less sensitive to ﬂuctuations in local labor market conditions in
the top decile of the distribution than is the case for whites while the reverse is true in the bottom
half: at the 20th percentile the coeﬃcient associated to the county unemployment rate is -0.0156 for
whites compared to -0.0626 for blacks.
The large diﬀerences in the returns to educational attainment and experience at the top of the
distribution could result from some combination of both unmeasured ability and discrimination. We
know that the composition eﬀects are largely driven by education and experience and one dimension
of unmeasured ability could be that blacks receive a lower quality of education. In this view, if black
workers become more educated and receive education of more similar quality, the racial wage gap
in performance pay jobs would decrease. Yet, Panel B of Table 2 shows that the racial diﬀerence
in returns to education and experience rises quite sharply in the top decile of the performance
pay job wage distribution and it might stretch credibility to contend that the quality of education
suddenly diverges above the 90th percentile. While diﬀerences in educational quality are far from
the only dimension of unmeasured ability, it clearly remains possible that performance pay jobs at
the top of distribution could be associated with greater latitude to discriminate by either managers
or customers.
6.2.2 Workers in Non-Performance Pay Jobs
Turning to Panel A of Table 3, the ﬁrst thing to note is that while having at least a B.A. degree
matters, there is little evidence that it matters more at the top of the distribution than it does in the
middle. This is also true for potential experience, whose contribution to the overall composition eﬀect
is negligible throughout. This indicates that, indeed, performance pay does seem to be associated
more with having a highly skilled group of workers relative to non performance pay jobs. Further
evidence of this is provided by looking at the contribution of parental education to the composition
eﬀect. We can see that contrary to the case of performance pay jobs, having more educated parents
seems to matter more in terms of accounting for part of the composition eﬀect in the bottom half
of the distribution than it does at the top.
Turning to Panel B and the contribution of the covariates to the wage structure eﬀects, perhaps
the most striking result is the change relative to performance pay jobs in the diﬀerential impact
of the local unemployment rate. While, as in the case of performance pay job workers, there is
evidence that wages in the bottom half of the distribution are more responsive to local labor market
conditions for blacks than for whites, there is none of the dramatic reversal at the top that we
observe for performance pay job workers. In fact the wage of black and white workers are equally
invariant to ﬂuctuations in the conditions of the labor market (the coeﬃcient for whites is equal
-0.0059 compared to -0.0050 for blacks). This lack of sensitivity of black wages to ﬂuctuations in
local labor market conditions, which would translate into a higher total compensation when the
times are good in performance pay jobs, could explain why performance pay jobs may not be as
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attractive to skilled black workers as they are to skilled white workers. As illustrated in Figure 13,
performance pay jobs simply do not seem to be able to pull the top end of the wage distribution
for black workers, contrary to what we observe for white workers. One reason for it is that there
is no strong evidence that skilled blacks at the top end are selected into performance pay jobs to a
greater extent than they are in non performance pay jobs. This pure selection eﬀect would in itself
drive up the wage gap between white and black workers in performance pay jobs as one reaches the
top end.
Clearly we are limited in terms of what we can infer about the driving forces behind the fact
that the inequality-enhancing eﬀect of performance pay appears to be a strictly white phenomenon.
Discrimination could be a factor. At least it can help explain why the returns to education and
experience are lower for blacks than for whites in performance pay jobs. However skills themselves
also can explain a signiﬁcant portion of the wage gap.
6.3 Further Evidence on Selectivity into Performance Pay
6.3.1 Performance Pay in the NLSY
As pointed out above, it seems as though more skilled black workers are not disproportionately
attracted to performance pay jobs relative to whites. We can gain some further insight into this
by exploiting the presence of the AFQT test score in the NLSY in addition to questions on pay
methods which allow us to construct an indicator for performance pay jobs the same way we do
using the PSID.15 Unfortunately the questions on pay methods run from 1988 to 1990 and then
from 1996 onward. This considerably exacerbates the misclassiﬁcation problem discussed in the
data section. As a consequence, any diﬀerence between workers in performance pay jobs and those
in non performance pay jobs will be understated. That, as well as the fact that the NLSY follows
a narrowly deﬁned cohort, explains why we chose to focus on the more consistent PSID to perform
the analysis. Still, the presence of the AFQT scores provides an opportunity to see the extent to
which whites may be more likely to select into performance pay jobs as one moves to the top of the
skill distribution. It also allows us to see whether the patterns documented above using the PSID
hold for this younger age group.
In Figure 15 we plot the raw AFQT score percentiles by types of jobs for both blacks and whites.
The visual impression is quite striking and is strongly supportive of the evidence reported using
the PSID. As Panels A and B show, there is little evidence that blacks with better AFQT results
systematically select into performance pay the way that white workers do. In fact, it is interesting
to note that the shape of the AFQT distribution in performance pay jobs for whites looks similar
to Figures 2 and 3 in Johnson and Neal (1996). Those ﬁgures, also from the NLSY, showed a clear
15The NLSY asks explicitly about pay for performance in the 1988, 1989, 1990, 1996, 1998 and 2000 waves of the
panel. A ﬁrst question is asked about whether part of the worker's pay is based on job performance. Note that workers
are asked to ignore proﬁt sharing (for which there is a separate question). Then they are asked to identify whether it
takes the form of piece rates, commissions, or bonuses. As in the case of the PSID, we only focus on males. We also
impose a couple of additional sample restrictions similar to those used by Gibbons et al. (2005). As in the case of the
PSID, we classify a job as a performance pay job when the worker reports performance pay at least once on this job.
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single peak of the black distribution to the left of a clear single peak for the white distribution of
AFQT scores. While the single peak to the left is clear for blacks in both types of jobs, the peak to
the right for whites appears to be largely driven entirely by those in performance pay jobs. Quite
clearly, performance pay jobs are the main driving force behind the fact that the white distribution
is left-skewed.
As an additional piece of evidence, notwithstanding the fact that the misclassiﬁcation problem
is magniﬁed in the NLSY, in Figure 16 we show the white-black hourly earnings wage gap in both
types of jobs. Note that for comparability purposes across data sets we use total annual earnings
divided by annual hours. As with the March CPS, we believe this wage measure is much more likely
to include all components of pay, as opposed to a point-in-time measure.
The main pattern of a sharply increasing wage gap as one reaches the top of distribution emerges
once again. On the other hand, the decline in the white-black wage gap in non performance pay
jobs that we see in the PSID is much less apparent here. In fact the white-black wage gap is
roughly constant over much of the wage distribution, except perhaps at the very top where it rises.
However, we believe that one should be cautious in interpreting the diﬀerent visual impression for
non performance pay job workers suggested by Figure 16 relative to what we see in Figure 9 with
the PSID. As mentioned above, the shorter NLSY panel exacerbates the misclassiﬁcation problem.
In Appendix 2 we describe a simple, empirically tractable, measurement framework in which we
make more concrete the nature of the biases imparted by wrongly classifying performance pay jobs
as non performance pay jobs. We show that under reasonable assumptions, the white-black wage
gap in non performance pay jobs is overstated and the magnitude of the overstatement increases as
one approaches the top end of the distribution.
Overall, we view the descriptive evidence provided in Figure 16 as broadly agreeing with what
we show using the PSID. Interestingly, given that the NLSY focuses on a generally younger cohort
of workers than those surveyed in the PSID, it also provides a view as to whether there has been a
change over time in the patterns of the wage gaps in both types of jobs. It would appear that the
key ﬁnding that performance pay has been the main driving force behind larger racial wage gaps at
the top of the distribution is an empirical regularity and not the consequence of some special feature
of the PSID.
6.3.2 The Wage Eﬀect of Performance Pay
To provide more direct evidence on selection into performance pay jobs, we estimate separate log
wage regressions for blacks and for whites on the performance pay job dummy and the same set
of variables used in our counterfactual analysis. We examine the change in the performance pay
coeﬃcient for blacks compared to whites in going from OLS to ﬁxed-eﬀects estimates. This change
provides direct evidence regarding selection on ﬁxed unobservables.
Looking at Table 4, there is little diﬀerence between the OLS and ﬁxed-eﬀects coeﬃcient for
blacks. If anything, the estimated coeﬃcient increases although it remains imprecise. Clear evidence
of positive selection emerges for whites as the ﬁxed-eﬀects coeﬃcient is markedly smaller. This stands
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as a further indication that the nature of selection diﬀers for blacks and whites.
Of course the preceding analysis applies only to the conditional mean and is not informative about
speciﬁc parts of the distribution. We gain some insight into this by performing quantile regressions
for the white and black wage distributions. Although in principle one could use the ﬁxed-eﬀects
quantile regression methodology proposed by Koenker (2004), it assumes that the ﬁxed eﬀects are
independent of the quantiles. This makes it unappealing as our interest is precisely how selection
varies across quantiles of the black and white wage distributions. As an alternative, we perform
two separate regressions by quantile for each race, with and without the PSID family background
variables. At issue is how these markers of ability inﬂuence the performance pay coeﬃcient in
diﬀerent parts of the distributions. Positive selection would be reﬂected in the performance pay
coeﬃcient being smaller in the estimates including family background.16
As we can see in Table 5, including the family background variables for blacks generally increases,
not decreases, the magnitude of the performance pay job coeﬃcient. More importantly, this emerges
only as one moves toward the top of the distribution. The results for whites are basically inconclusive,
at least relative to blacks.
In total, the results of this subsection indicate substantial diﬀerences by race in the process gov-
erning who selects into performance pay jobs. Our counterfactual analysis clearly showed that even
controlling for composition, there exists a signiﬁcant racial diﬀerence in the returns to characteristics
associated with productivity-education and experience-in performance pay jobs. This was especially
evident at the top of the earnings distribution and corresponds with high skill blacks being less
eager than high skill whites to enter performance pay jobs. Seen this way, our evidence of a sharply
increasing raw white-black wage gap at the top of the performance pay distribution results both from
lower returns to skills for blacks and from high skill blacks being less likely to select performance
pay jobs.
6.3.3 The Choice of Working in the Public vs the Private Sector
A key reason for focusing on the private sector is the cleaner connection between productivity
and pay resulting from the proﬁt maximization motive. Yet, workers may also elect to work in the
public sector. If the selection process governing this choice diﬀers across race, there may be important
consequences for the measured private sector wage diﬀerentials. While showing some variation across
time and level of government, the white-black earnings diﬀerential is generally much smaller in the
public sector during our study periods (Smith (1980) and Heywood (1989)). Moreover, the public
sector is recognized as having a far more compressed wage structure with far less individualization
of earnings (Bender (2003) and Borjas (2002)). This compression has grown over our study period
and, according to Borjas (2002), is responsible for the public sector ﬁnding it increasingly diﬃcult
to attract and retain high skill workers. Thus, high skill white workers may avoid the public sector
because of this compression and the lack of individualization of earnings. At the same time, our
16See Koenker and Hallock (2001) and Deaton (1997) for other examples of how the relationship between the
dependent variable and the independent variables changes across quantiles.
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earlier evidence makes it unclear whether or not high skill blacks will follow suit.
To investigate these issues we add to our base sample of private sector workers all those working
in the public sector. This results in adding 2298 observations for 445 black workers and 4326
observations for 679 white workers. The relative importance of black workers in the subsample of
public sector workers provides a ﬁrst indication of the importance of that sector for blacks.
In Figure 17 we show the within-race wage gap between private and public sector workers. We
show both the raw wage gap and the counterfactual one if workers in the private sector had the same
distribution of characteristics as those in the public sector. Since we want to examine how measured
skills may be rewarded diﬀerently across sectors, our counterfactual wage gaps make use of only
education, potential experience, employer tenure, and interactions between those three markers of
productive characteristics.17 While white workers in roughly the top 20 percentiles earn more in
the private sector, and increasingly so, the same is not true for black workers at the top end. For
them, the raw wage gap in the top 20 percentiles is around zero. If we look at the counterfactual
wage gaps, we can see that white private sector workers would do even better relative to their public
sector counterparts if they had the same distribution of skills.18 On the other hand, controlling for
composition does not change markedly the wage gap for blacks at the top end. High skill blacks are
paid about the same whether they work in the public or the private sector while high skill whites are
paid much more in the private sector. In short, the general results on earnings and sorting presented
by Borjas (2002) apply only to whites. The absence of a sizable wage gap for blacks increases the
likelihood that they will enter the public sector contributing to creating a relative void at the top
end of the black skill distribution in the private sector and exacerbating wage diﬀerences between
white and blacks workers.
In Figure 18 we plot the white-black wage gap in the public sector. While the raw wage gap is
positive and substantial, it remains relatively constant across the distribution. There is no evidence
of the sharp increase in the white-black wage diﬀerential at the top as in the private sector. More
importantly, once we control for composition, there is also no evidence of any positive diﬀerence
between white and black workers' wages in the public sector except in the bottom quantiles. We view
this as being consistent with more rigid pay practices in that sector, with less room for discretion.
This rigidity appears to attract high skill blacks but not high skill whites.19
We now investigate whether or not the unmeasured (by the econometrician) worker characteris-
tics diﬀer by race between the two sectors. To do so we estimate a simple error component model
17What we have in mind is that wage setting practices in the public sector-the pay scales- rely heavily on those
worker attributes. As it turns out, whether we also include marital status, occupations, collective bargaining, and
interactions between those and education and experience does not make much of a diﬀerence qualitatively. Of course
we have to exclude industries to avoid having a prefect predictor of public sector status in the construction of our
DFL weights.
18While 9.5% of black workers hold at least a B.A. degree in the private sector, 12.4% do so in the public sector.
For whites, the corresponding ﬁgures are 22.7% and 43.4%.
19Interestingly, the desire to reduce the rigidities in the compensation practices of the federal government led to
the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 creating a pay-for-performance system whose goal was to more explicitly tie
performance to ﬁnancial incentives instead of the common practice of having salary increases based on length of
service only (Milkovich and Wigdor (1991)). The book edited by Milkovich and Wigdor provides a comprehensive
assessment of the potential for merit pay in the civil service as well as of its potential pitfalls.
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separately for each group/sector. Letting lwit be the log hourly wage of worker i at time t, for the
public sector workers we have:
lwpublicit = Xitβ
public + αi + ε
public
ijt , (2)
while the log-wage equation for the private sector workers is
lwprivateit = Xitβ
private + dαi + ε
private
ijt (3)
where Xit is the set of observable characteristics with a conformable parameter vector β, αi is the
unmeasured component of variance associated with worker i (with factor loading d for private sector
workers), and εit is an idiosyncratic residual component. Note that we normalize to one the factor
loading associated with the public sector. To estimate (σ2α, d
2σ2α, σ
2
ε(public), and σ
2
ε(private)),
we take the residuals of the regression of lwit on the observables Xit and we then estimate the
variance components by ﬁtting regression models to all the cross-products of the residuals for the
same individual. Implicit in the formulation of the error structure is the assumption that the
distribution of the worker component αi is the same in both sectors. It is this homogeneity that allows
identiﬁcation of the factor loading d, the extent to which unmeasured skills are rewarded diﬀerently
in the private sector.20 Otherwise we would potentially mix workers located at diﬀerent parts of the
skill distribution. In essence, just as it is important to control for composition by reweighting the
distribution of observables in our counterfactual exercises, here we control for composition by using
the sub-sample of workers observed in both sectors in the course of their careers.21
The results are reported in Table 6. Looking ﬁrst at Panel A, the return to unmeasured char-
acteristics is signiﬁcantly smaller for black workers in the private sector. This would seem counter
intuitive if one views the private sector as uniformly better able to accommodate diﬀerences in
productivity but ﬁts with high skill black workers sorting out of the private sector. As might be
expected, the return for white workers is far larger, more than 23% larger, in the private sector than
in the public sector, and the diﬀerence is statistically signiﬁcant. Thus, blacks with unmeasured
skills are more likely to be attracted to the public sector just as whites with unmeasured skills are
more likely to be attracted to the private sector.
We brieﬂy summarize the ﬁndings associated with our exploration of the public sector. First,
black workers at the top of the skill distribution face less incentive to work in the private sector than
do white workers. Second, and related, racial wage diﬀerentials in the public sector can be fully
explained by observables, which we view as being consistent with the greater earnings rigidity in
the public sector. Third, unmeasured skills are rewarded to a far greater extent for white workers in
the private sector. For blacks, this pattern is reversed with somewhat greater returns in the public
20In eﬀect we estimate (and report) σ˜2α ≡ d2σ2α and simply test whether σ˜2α =σ2α, which is suﬃcient for our purpose.
Taking the ratio of σ˜2α estimated with private sector workers to σ
2
α estimated with public sector workers would identify
d2.
21Naturally, we should be cautious here and view this as a ﬁrst-order approximation. If there are learning eﬀects
such as in Gibbons, Katz, Lemieux and Parent (2005), and those learning eﬀects diﬀer across sectors and races, then
the underlying distributions of the worker components would be time-varying.
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sector.
We should be careful to reiterate that these ﬁndings may result from many forces. As a con-
sequence, we refrain from making a strong causal link between, say, the fact that high skill black
workers are paid the same in both sectors and high skill blacks being more likely to choose the public
sector because they are discriminated against in the private sector. We simply do not have the evi-
dence to substantiate such a strong conclusion. Yet, the various pieces of evidence we oﬀer remain
consistent with high skill black workers facing less obvious choices about sector and performance
pay jobs than may be the case for high skill white workers.
7 Conclusion
In this paper we make several contributions. First, we demonstrate that the association of perfor-
mance pay with increased inequality at the top end of the wage distribution in the United States is
largely a whites only phenomenon. While black workers in performance pay are paid more than in
non performance pay jobs over a fairly wide range of the distribution, the diﬀerence is more modest
than in the case of white workers and it basically shrinks to zero at the top end at the same time
as it increases sharply for whites. Second, because performance pay stretches the white earnings
distribution but not the black distribution, the white-black earnings diﬀerential among those earning
performance pay tends to grow over the earnings distribution, dramatically so in the upper quin-
tile. This remains true even when examining suitable counterfactuals that hold constant observables
between whites and blacks. Third, this pattern diﬀers substantially from the white-black earnings
diﬀerential among those not in performance pay jobs which tends to decline over the distribution
and essentially reaches zero toward the top when examining the suitable counterfactuals. Finally,
although our full analysis makes use of the PSID only, those broad patterns are consistent with what
we observe for the younger cohort of workers followed in the NLSY.
Two broad hypotheses exist that might suggest why earnings diﬀerentials are larger at the top of
the performance pay distribution. On the one hand, there may be unmeasured ability that if appro-
priately accounted for would cause the diﬀerentials to vanish when examining the counterfactuals.
We note that including family background caused the racial earnings diﬀerential to decline but did
not eliminate its run up at the top of distribution which approached 30 percent. On the other hand,
it may be that performance pay at the top of the distribution allows greater latitude for prejudice
to be translated into earnings diﬀerentials. Moreover, the possibility for selection between sectors
causes these hypotheses to be related. If more able blacks felt they were not to be rewarded for their
ability in performance pay jobs, they may not select those jobs even as more able whites do select
them. Our evidence based on the AFQT as well as on the wage eﬀect of being in a performance pay
job is consistent with this diﬀerential pattern of selection.
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8 Appendix 1
8.1 The Basic DFL Reweighting Procedure
As a ﬁrst step, we outline the reweighting method developed in DiNardo, Fortin and Lemieux
(1996) (henceforth DFL) used to compute counterfactual wage distributions. That method allows
for comparing distributions across groups by ﬁxing the composition of the observables to be the
same in distribution.
Consider the following two (log) wage (w) distributions, one for blacks (B = 1) and one for
whites (B = 0):
g(w|B = 1) =
∫
f(w|x,B = 1)h(x|B = 1)dx
g(w|B = 0) =
∫
(w|x,B = 0)h(x|B = 0)dx
where g(), f() and h() are densities. One may be interested in knowing what the distribution for
whites would be if they had the same distribution of characteristics as that for blacks:
gcB=1(w|B = 0) =
∫
f(w|x,B = 0)h(x|B = 1)dx
From the deﬁnition of conditional probabilities we have:
h(x) =
h(x|B = 1)Prob(B = 1)
Prob(B = 1|x)
and
h(x) =
h(x|B = 0)Prob(B = 0)
Prob(B = 0|x)
Consequently,
h(x|B = 1) = h(x|B = 0)Prob(B = 1|x)Prob(B = 0)
Prob(B = 0|x)Prob(B = 1)
and one can rewrite the counterfactual distribution as
gcB=1(w|B = 0) =
∫
Θf(w|x,B = 0)h(x|B = 0)dx
where Θ = Prob(B=1|x)Prob(B=0)Prob(B=0|x)Prob(B=1) . Thus we simply reweight the distribution for whites such that the
underlying distribution of x′s matches that of blacks.
8.2 Extension of DFL to Accommodate Multiple Dimensions of Choice
In our application we are interested in the eﬀect that being in a performance pay job (ppj = 1)
has on the distribution of wages for both whites and blacks. We are also interested in computing
counterfactual distributions such as what would happen to whites in performance pay jobs if they
had the same distribution of x′s as blacks in performance pay jobs. This gives rise to an added
complication in that non only do we compare whites and blacks, but we also want to make compar-
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isons using both race and the type of compensation the workers have. One way to simplify this is
simply to select the subsamples of interest and perform the standard DFL decomposition using two
groups. For example, we may decide to keep workers in performance pay jobs only and then focus
on white-black wage diﬀerences. Alternatively we can select blacks only and then look at diﬀerences
across types of jobs. However performing such sample selections would result in estimating a diﬀer-
ent weight than the one we would obtain if we kept the full sample. To see this, suppose we want to
know what the distribution of white wages (B = 0) in performance pay jobs (ppj = 1) would look
like if they had the same distribution of x′s as blacks (B = 1) in performance pay jobs:
gcB=1,ppj=1(w|B = 0) =
∫
f(w|x,B = 0, ppj = 1)h(x|B = 1, ppj = 1)dx
Again using the deﬁnition of conditional probabilities we have:
h(x) =
h(x|B = 1, ppj = 1)Prob(ppj = 1|B = 1)Prob(B = 1)
Prob(B = 1|x)Prob(ppj = 1|x,B = 1)
and
h(x) =
h(x|B = 0, ppj = 1)Prob(ppj = 1|B = 0)Prob(B = 0)
Prob(B = 0|x)Prob(ppj = 1|x,B = 0)
Hence
h(x|B = 1, ppj = 1) = h(x|B = 0, ppj = 1)Prob(B = 0|x)Prob(ppj = 1|x,B = 1)
Prob(B = 0|x)Prob(ppj = 1|x,B = 0)
×Prob(ppj = 1|B = 0)Prob(B = 0)
Prob(ppj = 1|B = 1)Prob(B = 1)
As in the standard DFL weight, the last part can be dropped as those probabilities simply
represent sample proportions. Thus the counterfactual wage distribution is equal to:
gcB=1,ppj=1(w|B = 0) =
∫
Θf(w|x,B = 0, ppj = 1)h(x|B = 0, ppj = 1)dx
whereΘ = Prob(B=1|x)Prob(ppj=1|x,B=1)Prob(B=0|x)Prob(ppj=1|x,B=0) . The weight computed using the pre-selected subsample of
workers in performance pay jobs, Prob(B=1|x)Prob(B=0|x) would be equal to Θ only if
Prob(ppj=1|x,B=1)
Prob(ppj=1|x,B=0) = 1.
There is little reason to suspect that this need be true in general as it requires that the selection
process into performance pay jobs be exactly the same for whites and blacks. We use this extended
DFL decomposition to compute the various counterfactual distributions of interest.
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9 Appendix 2: How Misclassiﬁcation Aﬀects the White-Black Wage
Gap in the NLSY
In this appendix we show under a certain set of conditions that the mean wage gap between white
workers and black workers in non performance pay jobs tends to be magniﬁed due to the fact that
some performance pay jobs are wrongly classiﬁed as non performance pay jobs. Let PPJ∗ be a
dummy indicating whether a job is truly one that pays for performance. The probability that
PPJ∗ = 1 depends on observed characteristics X (education, occupation, etc.) and race:
Pr(PPJ∗ = 1|X, j) = q(X, j). j = White, Black
Let P represent the probability that we observe a performance payment in a given time period,
conditional on PPJ∗ = 1, and let T represent the number of observations we have for a job match.
It follows that:
Pr(PPJ = 1|X,T, j) = q(X,T, j) = q(X, j)[1− (1− P )T ],
and
Pr(PPJ∗ = 1|PPJ = 1, X, T, j) = Pr(PPJ∗ = 1|PPJ = 1, j) = 1
where PPJ = 1 if we observe a performance payment for the job at least once. So if we observe
PPJ = 1, we make the assumption that we know for sure that it is really a performance-pay job
(PPJ∗ = 1). But when we observe PPJ = 0, it may be that the job is or is not one that pays for
performance. We have:
Pr(PPJ∗ = 1|PPJ = 0, X, T, j) = Pr(PPJ
∗ = 1, PPJ = 0|X,T, j)
Pr(PPJ = 0|X,T, j)
=
q(X, j)− q(X,T, j)
1− q(X,T, j)
which is the fraction of PPJ misclassiﬁed as non-PPJ, and
Pr(PPJ∗ = 0|PPJ = 0, X, T ) = 1− q(X, j)
1− q(X,T, j)
Using the wage equations
W pj = Xjb
p
j + e
p
j ,
Wnj = Xjb
n
j + e
n
j ,
where the superscripts p and n represent performance pay and non performance pay jobs respectively,
and the assumption that PPJ∗ does not depend on the error term (it only depends on X as well as
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the race indicator), it follows that:
E(W |PPJ = 0, X, T, j) = Pr(PPJ∗ = 1|PPJ = 0, X, T, j) · E(W |PPJ∗ = 1, X, j)
+ Pr(PPJ∗ = 0|PPJ = 0, X, T, j) · E(W |PPJ∗ = 1, X, j)
=
q(X, j)− q(X,T, j)
1− q(X,T, j) ·Xjb
p
j +
1− q(X, j)
1− q(X,T, j) ·Xjb
n
j
= Xjb
p
j +
1− q(X, j)
1− q(X,T, j) ·Xj(b
n
j − bpj )
Our interest is in estimating22
E(W |PPJ = 0, X, T,White)− E(W |PPJ = 0, X, T,Black)
= (XW b
p
W −XBbpB) +
1− q(X,White)
1− q(X,T,White) ·XW (b
n
W − bpW ) (4)
− 1− q(X,Black)
1− q(X,T,Black) ·XB(b
n
B − bpB)
Note that if there were no misclassiﬁcation errors then the probability ratios would be equal to
one and we would have:
E(W |PPJ = 0, X, T,White)− E(W |PPJ = 0, X, T,Black) = (XW bnW −XBbnB)
In terms of estimation, q(X,T, j) can be estimated by ﬁtting a logit or linear probability model
(with year dummies being part of X) for each group. Now, from the equation
Pr(PPJ = 1|X,T, j) = q(X,T, j) = q(X, j)[1− (1− P )T ],
it follows that q(X, j) = limT→∞ q(X,T, j).
With any reasonable value of P (e.g. P = .25, i.e. performance pay received only one year out
of four), it follows that when T is large we have q(X, , j) ≈ q(X, j). However, one problem with
using the NLSY is that tenure levels are low, which prevents us from relying on that approximation
when using that data set. With the PSID, though, the longest T observed in the data is 22. So to
circumvent the issue of the short NLSY panel we can run a logit model using the PSID to estimate
q(X,T, j) as the predicted probability of performance pay, and get q(X, j) by replacing the observed
value of T with T = 22 (this gives us an estimate of 1−q(X,j)1−q(X,T,j) for j = Blacks, Whites in the PSID).
Then we use the NLSY to estimate get an estimate of q(X,T, j) speciﬁc to that data set. To get an
estimate of 1−q(X,j)1−q(X,T,j) for workers in the NLSY we then use the approximation of q(X, j) computed
with the PSID divided by the estimate of q(X,T, j) obtained using the NLSY. Those estimates are:
22Given our assumption that the observed performance pay jobs status is a fully reliable signal of true status, the
white-black wage gap in performance pay jobs is not aﬀected by misclassiﬁcation errors.
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Blacks Whites
1− q(X, j)-PSID .438 .371
1− q(X,T, j)-PSID .658 .583
1− q(X,T, j)-NLSY .777 .705
1−q(X,j)
1−q(X,T,j) -PSID .666 .636
1−q(X,j)
1−q(X,T,j) -NLSY .564 .526
Not surprisingly given the shorter NLSY panel, the probability that a performance pay job is
wrongly classiﬁed as a non performance pay job is higher. If we re-write equation (4) using as
a further approximation the fact that r(W ) ≡ 1−q(X,White)1−q(X,T,White) ≈ 1−q(X,Black)1−q(X,T,Black) ≡ r(B), after some
re-arrangement we get:
E(W |PPJ = 0, X, T,White)− E(W |PPJ = 0, X, T,Black) (5)
= (1− r(B))(XW bpW −XBbpB) + r(B)(XW bnW −XBbnB)
Thus, the measured average White-Black wage gap in non performance pay jobs turns out to be a
linear combination of the true wage gap (XW bnW −XBbnB) and the performance pay job wage gap
(XW b
p
W −XBbpB). We can see that the lower is the ratio r(B) the greater will be the weight placed
on the gap between white and black workers in performance pay jobs. Consequently, we would
expect that the raw non performance pay job wage gap measured in the NLSY would be larger than
in the PSID, all else held equal. Note that the derivation above is for the mean wage gap. Looking
at Appendix Figure 2, we can see that the gap in performance pay jobs increases sharply once we
reach the top decile of the distribution. Assuming a constant true wage gap in non performance pay
jobs, we would nevertheless see an increase in the measured gap due to the increasing importance
of the ﬁrst term on the right-hand side of equation (5).
The main caveat to this analysis is that we are assuming that non performance pay jobs are never
misclassiﬁed as performance pay jobs. Whether e.g. a Christmas bonus makes a job a performance
pay job is debatable. We also assume that the adjustment ratios for Blacks and Whites are the
same. The estimates shown above suggest that this may be a reasonable approximation.
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Figure 5.  Distribution of Log Wages in Performance Pay Jobs
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Figure 8.  Distribution of Log Wages for Blacks
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Figure 9. White−Black Gap Wage Gap by Type of Jobs
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Figure 10. Wage Gap Between PP Jobs and Non−PP Jobs by Group
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Figure 11. White−Black Wage Gap in Performance Pay Jobs
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Figure 12. White−Black Wage Gap in Non Performance Pay Jobs
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Figure 13. Wage Gap Between PP Jobs and Non PP Jobs: PSID 1976−1998
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Figure 14. Decomposition of Wage Gaps: PSID 1976−1998
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Figure 15.  Distribution of AFQT Score by Type of Jobs
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Figure 16. White−Black Wage Gap by Type of Jobs
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Figure 17. Wage Gap Between Private and Public Sectors: PSID 1976−1998
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Figure 18. White−Black Wage Gap in Public Sector Jobs
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Log Wage
F(log Wage)
Prob(B)
Prob(W)
     q(.5)_B                q(.5)_W
q(.5)_W − q(.5)_B = (approx) [(Prob(B)−Prob(W)]/f
where f is the slope of the cumulative dist. F
Figure A1. The RIF Method
W: Whites
B: Blacks
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Table 1. Summary Statistics: Panel Study of Income Dynamics   1976-1998
Blacks Whites
Non-performance- Performance-pay Non-performance- Performance-pay
pay Jobs Jobs pay Jobs Jobs
[1] [2] [1] [2]
Average Hourly Earnings ($79) 6.47 7.24 8.50 11.16
Age 38.11 37.75 38.16 39.17
Education 11.78 12.39 12.60 13.49
Potential Experience 20.34 19.36 19.56 19.68
Employer Tenure 6.47 10.99 7.58 9.15
Married 0.60 0.60 0.73 0.79
Covered by CBA 0.32 0.30 0.27 0.13
Paid by the Hour 0.82 0.57 0.64 0.28
Paid a Salary 0.16 0.29 0.34 0.53
Annual Hours Worked 2018.07 2221.61 2137.04 2296.18
Father high school graduate 0.20 0.30 0.24 0.28
Mother high school graduate 0.20 0.38 0.42 0.43
Father B.A.+ 0.02 0.03 0.09 0.12
Mother B.A.+ 0.02 0.01 0.05 0.09
Father professional 0.01 0.04 0.08 0.11
Father manager 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.07
# workers (Tot:2908) 797 302 1702 923
# Job Matches (Tot: 7159) 1683 383 3747 1346
# Observations (Tot: 25258) 4771 2157 11059 7271
Notes: The sample consists of male household heads aged 18-65 working in private 
sector, wage and salary jobs. All figures in the table represent sample means.
Education, potential experience, and employer tenure are measured in years.
Potential experience is defined as age minus education minus 6. Performance-pay
jobs are employment relationships in which part of the worker's total compensation
includes a variable pay component (bonus, commission, piece rate). Any worker 
who reports overtime pay is considered to be in a non-performance-pay job. Workers
are considered unionized if they are covered by a collective bargaining agreement.
If the respondents either do not know their parents' level of schooling or they
do not want to answer, then those parents are assigned to less than high school.
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Table 2. Effect of Variables on Black-White Wage Gap by Quantile in Performance Pay Jobs: PSID 1976-1998
Quantile
Panel A: Composition Effects 20 50 70 80 90 95
Total 0.1369 0.1834 0.1801 0.2288 0.1828 0.2453 0.2332 0.3026 0.2527 0.3334 0.2736 0.3269
(0.0189) (0.0210) (0.0188) (0.0188) (0.0214) (0.0201) (0.0260) (0.0232) (0.0314) (0.0313) (0.0434) (0.0561)
High School Completed -0.0346 -0.0430 -0.0230 -0.0226 -0.0144 -0.0146 -0.0196 -0.0176 -0.0171 -0.0120 -0.0175 -0.0170
(0.0049) (0.0092) (0.0037) (0.0036) (0.0039) (0.0039) (0.0043) (0.0044) (0.0047) (0.0050) (0.0075) (0.0082)
Some College 0.0217 0.0160 0.0119 0.0097 0.0120 0.0096 0.0156 0.0115 0.0206 0.0147 0.0214 0.0171
(0.0032) (0.0041) (0.0021) (0.0019) (0.0023) (0.0021) (0.0028) (0.0025) (0.0036) (0.0032) (0.0049) (0.0045)
B.A. or More 0.0607 0.0572 0.0711 0.0929 0.0930 0.1215 0.1324 0.1689 0.1601 0.2015 0.1698 0.2158
(0.0055) (0.0139) (0.0054) (0.0064) (0.0069) (0.0080) (0.0093) (0.0105) (0.0121) 0.0139 (0.0165) (0.0202)
Potential Experience 0.0087 0.0169 0.0227 0.0148 0.0340 0.0237 0.0550 0.0370 0.0767 0.0473 0.0950 0.0582
(0.0032) (0.0054) (0.0030) (0.0021) (0.0039) (0.0030) (0.0054) (0.0044) (0.0080) (0.0061) (0.0127) (0.0089)
Employer Tenure -0.0046 -0.0001 -0.0050 -0.0001 -0.0054 -0.0001 -0.0057 -0.0001 -0.0040 -0.0001 -0.0045 -0.0001
(0.0017) (0.0012) (0.0019) (0.0018) (0.0020) (0.0018) (0.0022) (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0012) (0.0027) (0.0014)
Married 0.0384 0.0456 0.0152 0.0173 0.0248 0.0267 0.0240 0.0262 0.0356 0.0361 0.0037 0.0121
(0.0057) (0.0104) (0.0050) (0.0045) (0.0063) (0.0056) (0.0083) (0.0072) (0.0115) (0.0101) (0.0193) (0.0166)
Covered by CBA -0.0746 -0.0895 -0.0717 -0.0743 -0.0247 -0.0249 -0.0100 -0.0096 0.0124 0.0118 0.0050 0.0073
(0.0051) (0.0102) (0.0054) (0.0057) (0.0058) (0.0062) (0.0067) (0.0072) (0.0073) (0.0081) (0.0106) (0.0122)
County Unemployment Rate 0.0002 -0.0002 0.0002 -0.0002 0.0005 -0.0008 0.0009 -0.0013 0.0012 -0.0016 0.0014 -0.0019
(0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0009) (0.0008) (0.0014) (0.0013) (0.0018) (0.0017) (0.0022) (0.0020)
Father high school graduate - 0.0018 - 0.0011 - -0.0005 - -0.0026 - -0.0015 - 0.0010
(0.0026) (0.0010) (0.0013) (0.0019) (0.0028) (0.0045)
Mother high school graduate - -0.0007 - -0.0002 - 0.0000 - 0.0009 - 0.0016 - 0.0012
(0.0007) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0007) (0.0012) (0.0013)
Father B.A.+ - 0.0101 - 0.0086 - 0.0060 - 0.0017 - 0.0087 - 0.0251
(0.0058) (0.0025) (0.0033) (0.0045) (0.0070) (0.0124)
Mother B.A.+ - 0.0071 - -0.0024 - 0.0025 - 0.0155 - 0.0298 - 0.0264
(0.0055) (0.0024) (0.0032) (0.0045) (0.0075) (0.0120)
Father professional - -0.0056 - -0.0093 - -0.0226 - 0.0321 - -0.0522 - -0.0717
(0.0062) (0.0030) (0.0042) (0.0059) (0.0089) (0.0160)
Father manager - 0.0056 - -0.0007 - -0.0020 - -0.0044 - -0.0240 - -0.0198
(0.0047) (0.0024) (0.0032) (0.0046) (0.0071) (0.0123)
Father in sales - 0.0064 - -0.0017 - -0.0030 - 0.0002 - 0.0059 - 0.0119
(0.0018) (0.0011) (0.0014) (0.0020) (0.0038) (0.0073)
Total Accounted for*: 0.1753 0.2019 0.1870 0.2329 0.2410 0.3083 0.2625 0.3238 0.3238 0.3399 0.3042 0.2603
(0.0135) (0.0298) (0.0120) (0.0129) (0.0135) (0.0150) (0.0176) (0.0193) (0.0248) (0.0285) (0.0417) (0.0467)
Approximation Error -0.0383 -0.0185 -0.0068 -0.0041 -0.0581 -0.0630 -0.0293 -0.0212 -0.0711 -0.0065 -0.0307 0.0666
(0.0219) (0.0206) (0.0200) (0.0206) (0.0220) (0.0216) (0.0268) (0.0249) (0.0317) (0.0340) (0.0491) (0.0635)
(s.e.)
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(Table 2, continued) Quantile
Panel B: Wage Structure Effects 20 50 70 80 90 95
Total 0.2570 0.2106 0.3016 0.2529 0.1770 0.1145 0.0706 0.0012 0.1410 0.0603 0.2536 0.2003
(0.0426) (0.0435) (0.0302) (0.0297) (0.0270) (0.0248) (0.0290) (0.0261) (0.0339) (0.0337) (0.0348) (0.0496)
High School Completed 0.1154 0.0753 0.0921 0.0968 0.0134 0.0522 0.0120 0.0246 0.0469 0.0761 0.0434 0.1480
(0.0628) (0.0659) (0.0392) (0.0399) (0.0273) (0.0263) (0.0268) (0.0260) (0.0337) (0.0344) (0.0339) (0.0467)
Some College -0.0292 -0.0479 -0.0454 -0.0322 -0.0250 0.0014 0.0019 0.0193 0.0225 0.0563 0.0561 0.0933
(0.0267) (0.0300) (0.0157) (0.0183) (0.0125) (0.0127) (0.0116) (0.0123) (0.0149) (0.0162) (0.0166) (0.0220)
B.A. or More -0.0075 -0.0485 0.0096 -0.0042 -0.0250 -0.0186 -0.0064 0.0071 0.1489 0.1480 0.2507 0.3310
(0.0327) (0.0248) (0.0212) (0.0176) 0.0187 (0.0144) (0.0194) (0.0150) (0.0257) (0.0233) (0.0297) (0.0391)
Potential Experience -0.0202 0.0110 -0.0407 0.0066 -0.0203 0.0511 0.0107 0.0627 0.1472 0.2061 0.3118 0.5270
(0.0824) (0.1050) (0.0524) (0.0728) (0.0436) (0.0461) (0.0423) (0.0482) (0.0591) (0.0623) (0.0686) (0.0948)
Employer Tenure -0.0230 0.0198 0.0832 0.0320 0.0338 -0.0225 0.0297 -0.0156 0.1232 0.0436 0.1338 0.1663
(0.0620) (0.0655) (0.0343) (0.0440) (0.0273) (0.0297) (0.0268) (0.0285) (0.0450) (0.0407) (0.0428) (0.0756)
Married -0.0562 -0.0303 0.0295 0.0412 0.0961 0.0945 0.1376 0.1416 0.1382 0.1261 0.0877 0.1582
(0.0445) (0.0515) (0.0287) (0.0327) (0.0257) (0.0273) (0.0288) (0.0305) (0.0403) (0.0416) (0.0390) (0.0530)
Covered by CBA 0.0419 0.0299 0.0141 0.0307 0.0127 0.0478 0.0365 0.0713 0.0047 0.0351 0.0310 -0.0094
(0.0328) (0.0359) (0.0228) (0.0224) (0.0194) (0.0194) (0.0199) (0.0200) (0.0223) (0.0270) (0.0273) (0.0394)
County Unemployment Rate 0.2960 0.3992 0.1348 0.1607 0.0029 -0.0194 -0.0807 -0.0286 -0.2979 -0.1399 -0.4082 -0.3883
(0.1143) (0.1128) (0.0651) (0.0684) (0.0508) (0.0504) (0.0495) (0.0511) (0.0740) (0.0731) (0.0794) (0.1235)
Father high school graduate - 0.0255 - -0.0046 - -0.0846 - -0.0578 - -0.0106 - 0.0746
(0.0644) (0.0319) (0.0206) (0.0209) (0.0272) (0.0376)
Mother high school graduate - -0.0974 - -0.0181 - 0.0609 - 0.0858 - 0.0577 - 0.0586
(0.0769) (0.0383) (0.0242) (0.0256) (0.0314) (0.0461)
Father B.A.+ - 0.0297 - 0.0202 - -0.0040 - -0.0167 - -0.0094 - 0.0087
(0.0095) (0.0070) (0.0054) (0.0056) (0.0112) (0.0123)
Mother B.A.+ - 0.0103 - 0.0115 - 0.0081 - 0.0081 - 0.0038 - 0.0034
(0.0042) (0.0023) (0.0016) (0.0017) (0.0019) (0.0026)
Father professional - -0.0035 - 0.0121 - 0.0160 - 0.0091 - 0.0044 - -0.0100
(0.0092) (0.0050) (0.0034) (0.0032) (0.0048) (0.0073)
Father manager - -0.0003 - 0.0000 - 0.0000 - 0.0001 - 0.0002 - 0.0001
(0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Father in sales - 0.0221 - 0.0028 - 0.0035 - 0.0057 - 0.0096 - 0.0171
(0.0065) (0.0022) (0.0019) (0.0021) (0.0032) (0.0066)
Constant 0.2586 0.1776 -0.2901 -0.0448 -0.1007 0.1744 -0.2763 -0.0030 -0.0393 0.1469 -0.1593 0.2337
(0.3129) (0.3084) (0.2208) (0.2349) (0.1843) (0.1894) (0.2346) (0.2465) (0.2227) (0.2533) (0.2991) (0.5117)
Total Accounted for: 0.2874 0.2300 0.3342 0.2972 0.1782 0.1493 0.0642 -0.0371 0.1348 0.0811 0.2491 0.2121
(0.0473) (0.0464) (0.0307) (0.0308) (0.0257) (0.0238) (0.0273) (0.0125) (0.0340) (0.0318) (0.0354) 0.0489 
Approximation Error -0.0304 -0.0194 -0.0327 -0.0442 -0.0012 -0.0348 0.0064 0.0382 0.0061 -0.0208 0.0045 -0.0117
(0.0256) (0.0259) (0.0179) (0.0189) (0.0136) (0.0143) (0.0123) (0.0240) (0.0111) (0.0125) (0.0085) (0.0102)
Notes. The contribution of the covariates to the composition effects is computed using the coefficients estimated with the RIF regression
who never worked, as well as deceased/absent fathers. 
(s.e.)
methodology of Firpo et al., 2007. See text for details. *Other covariates contributing to the composition effects but not shown here are
one-digit industries and occupations as well as year effects. Occupation effects for father are relative to laborers, service workers, those
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Table 3. Effect of Variables on Black-White Wage Gap by Quantile in Non Performance Pay Jobs: PSID 1976-1998
Quantile
Panel A: Composition Effects 20 50 70 80 90 95
Total 0.2206 0.3104 0.1852 0.2276 0.1501 0.2232 0.1283 0.1917 0.1434 0.2161 0.1328 0.2142
(0.0177) (0.0253) (0.0123) (0.0153) (0.0113) (0.0137) (0.0099) (0.0120) (0.0107) (0.0110) (0.0127) (0.0149)
High School Completed -0.0037 -0.0047 -0.0040 -0.0052 -0.0023 -0.0030 -0.0013 -0.0016 -0.0011 -0.0014 -0.0014 -0.0018
(0.0013) (0.0020) (0.0014) (0.0013) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0006)
Some College 0.0077 -0.0007 0.0086 0.0032 0.0064 0.0023 0.0045 0.0016 0.0025 0.0008 0.0024 0.0008
(0.0017) (0.0011) (0.0018) (0.0016) (0.0014) (0.0012) (0.0010) (0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0005) (0.0007) (0.0005)
B.A. or More 0.0337 0.0157 0.0433 0.0423 0.0409 0.0408 0.0364 0.0369 0.0388 0.0394 0.0428 0.0437
(0.0031) (0.0076) (0.0031) (0.0031) (0.0029) (0.0029) (0.0028) (0.0028) (0.0032) (0.0033) (0.0038) (0.0039)
Potential Experience -0.0034 -0.0003 -0.0042 -0.0023 -0.0043 -0.0024 -0.0051 -0.0025 -0.0060 -0.0028 -0.0700 -0.0031
(0.0010) (0.0009) (0.0014) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0010) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0013) (0.0012)
Employer Tenure -0.0037 -0.0023 -0.0045 -0.0160 -0.0041 -0.0143 -0.0028 -0.0099 -0.0019 -0.0064 -0.0009 -0.0026
(0.0015) (0.0046) (0.0017) (0.0020) (0.0016) (0.0019) (0.0011) (0.0014) (0.0008) (0.0013) (0.0005) (0.0013)
Married 0.0412 0.0600 0.0270 0.0284 0.0200 0.0210 0.0158 0.0163 0.0081 0.0089 0.0066 0.0071
(0.0040) (0.0078) (0.0028) (0.0030) (0.0023) (0.0025) (0.0022) (0.0023) (0.0024) (0.0026) (0.0028) (0.0030)
Covered by CBA -0.0054 0.0046 -0.0054 0.0046 -0.0036 0.0029 -0.0024 0.0019 -0.0011 0.0009 -0.0001 0.0001
(0.0022) (0.0040) (0.0023) (0.0022) (0.0015) (0.0014) (0.0010) (0.0009) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0003)
County Unemployment Rate 0.0023 -0.0034 -0.0008 -0.0009 -0.0002 0.0000 -0.0003 -0.0001 -0.0003 -0.0002 -0.0018 -0.0014
(0.0012) (0.0028) (0.0009) (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0007) (0.0009) (0.0007) (0.0010) (0.0008) (0.0011) (0.0009)
Father high school graduate - 0.0176 - 0.0031 - 0.0036 - 0.0020 - 0.0015 - 0.0007
(0.0040) (0.0010) (0.0009) (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0011)
Mother high school graduate - 0.0168 - 0.0189 - 0.0083 - 0.0053 - -0.0017 - -0.0058
(0.0109) (0.0038) (0.0033) (0.0032) (0.0036) (0.0042)
Father B.A.+ - 0.0254 - 0.0038 - 0.0058 - 0.0026 - 0.0053 - 0.0068
(0.0075) (0.0018) (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0022) (0.0031)
Mother B.A.+ - 0.0045 - 0.0018 - 0.0002 - -0.0003 - 0.0000 - 0.0015
(0.0041) (0.0011) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0017)
Father professional - -0.0194 - -0.0004 - -0.0058 - -0.0040 - -0.0044 - -0.0084
(0.0100) (0.0023) (0.0020) (0.0020) (0.0025) (0.0032)
Father manager - 0.0025 - 0.0045 - 0.0073 - 0.0096 - 0.0085 - 0.0133
(0.0053) (0.0017) (0.0016) (0.0017) (0.0022) (0.0029)
Father in sales - -0.0047 - 0.0170 - 0.0007 - 0.0015 - 0.0014 - 0.0016
(0.0032) (0.0010) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0011) (0.0014)
Total Accounted for*: 0.2604 0.3222 0.2012 0.2546 0.1492 0.2070 0.1260 0.1817 0.1030 0.1504 0.0897 0.1363
(0.0110) (0.0384) (0.0077) (0.0100) (0.0062) (0.0087) (0.0056) (0.0081) (0.0059) (0.0091) (0.0064) (0.0105)
Approximation Error -0.0399 -0.0118 -0.0161 -0.0270 0.0009 0.0162 0.0023 0.0100 0.0404 0.0657 0.0431 0.0780
(0.0196) (0.0235) (0.0118) (0.0163) (0.0104) (0.0141) (0.0090) (0.0124) (0.0097) (0.0116) (0.0113) (0.0152)
(s.e.)
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(Table 3, continued) Quantile
Panel B: Wage Structure Effects 20 50 70 80 90 95
Total 0.1090 0.0192 0.1287 0.0863 0.1140 0.0409 0.1009 0.0375 0.0599 0.0128 0.0501 0.0313
(0.0422) (0.0455) (0.0232) (0.0246) (0.0176) (0.0188) (0.0151) (0.0162) (0.0135) (0.0133) (0.0154) (0.0166)
High School Completed -0.1344 -0.1692 -0.0279 -0.0259 -0.0035 0.0146 -0.0171 -0.0051 0.0108 -0.0048 0.0139 -0.0185
(0.0482) (0.0525) (0.0272) (0.0283) (0.0210) (0.0223) (0.0158) (0.0168) (0.0135) (0.0146) (0.0132) (0.0174)
Some College -0.0213 -0.0748 0.0026 -0.0115 0.0092 0.0224 -0.0019 0.0116 0.0042 -0.0115 0.0063 -0.0133
(0.0278) (0.0327) (0.0136) (0.0156) (0.0095) (0.0117) (0.0074) (0.0090) (0.0062) (0.0066) (0.0062) (0.0076)
B.A. or More -0.0299 -0.0333 0.0024 -0.0015 0.0026 -0.0042 -0.0044 -0.0142 0.0005 0.0052 -0.0080 -0.0003
(0.0213) (0.0200) (0.0103) (0.0103) (0.0079) (0.0086) (0.0073) (0.0067) (0.0071) (0.0052) (0.0095) (0.0074)
Potential Experience -0.1157 -0.1687 -0.0941 -0.0441 -0.0944 -0.0574 -0.0742 -0.0513 -0.0196 -0.0119 -0.0294 -0.0327
(0.0851) (0.0903) (0.0492) (0.0473) (0.0364) (0.0374) (0.0290) (0.0310) (0.0224) (0.0252) (0.0254) (0.0366)
Employer Tenure -0.1807 -0.2165 -0.0896 -0.1394 -0.0321 -0.0887 -0.0050 -0.0346 -0.0112 0.0301 0.0034 0.0014
(0.0349) (0.0479) (0.0225) (0.0281) (0.0177) (0.0224) (0.0154) (0.0198) (0.0143) (0.0162) (0.0157) (0.0224)
Married -0.0615 -0.0081 0.0267 0.0436 0.0190 0.0452 0.0192 0.0347 0.0294 -0.0638 0.0230 -0.0570
(0.0537) (0.0525) (0.0275) (0.0278) (0.0201) (0.0216) (0.0172) (0.0186) (0.0144) (0.0153) (0.0152) (0.0190)
Covered by CBA 0.0077 0.0118 -0.0117 0.0035 0.0100 0.0336 0.0230 0.0345 0.0162 -0.0230 0.0158 -0.0208
(0.0237) (0.0242) (0.0145) (0.0140) (0.0122) (0.0123) (0.0104) (0.0111) (0.0098) (0.0113) (0.0107) (0.0144)
County Unemployment Rate 0.1052 0.1648 0.1672 0.1446 0.0897 0.0879 0.0070 0.0396 -0.0046 -0.0083 -0.0069 0.0091
(0.1266) (0.1269) (0.0567) (0.0599) (0.0452) (0.0467) (0.0377) (0.0414) (0.0348) (0.0360) (0.0374) (0.0406)
Father high school graduate - 0.0864 - 0.0286 - 0.0208 - 0.0292 - -0.0149 - -0.0138
(0.0096) (0.0155) (0.0097) (0.0073) (0.0065) (0.0084)
Mother high school graduate - 0.0293 - -0.0016 - -0.0059 - -0.0103 - -0.0059 - -0.0127
(0.0237) (0.0115) (0.0079) (0.0068) (0.0065) (0.0080)
Father B.A.+ - 0.0269 - 0.0012 - -0.0107 - -0.0105 - 0.0095 - 0.0150
(0.0143) (0.0061) (0.0038) (0.0034) (0.0021) (0.0031)
Mother B.A.+ - -0.0056 - -0.0046 - -0.0081 - -0.0094 - 0.0086 - 0.0120
(0.0066) (0.0032) (0.0024) (0.0020) (0.0018) (0.0025)
Father professional - -0.0033 - 0.0018 - 0.0048 - 0.0038 - -0.0018 - -0.0026
(0.0096) (0.0018) (0.0015) (0.0013) (0.0007) (0.0010)
Father manager - -0.0008 - -0.0003 - 0.0000 - 0.0003 - -0.0003 - -0.0003
(0.0004) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Father in sales - 0.0062 - 0.0042 - 0.0024 - 0.0023 - -0.0013 - -0.0009
(0.0035) (0.0012) (0.0007) (0.0013) (0.0009) (0.0010)
Constant 0.5335 0.1059 0.0102 -0.3169 -0.0592 -0.2761 -0.2763 -0.1410 0.0810 0.0061 0.0904 -0.1061
(0.2955) (0.3206) (0.1643) (0.1793) (0.1361) (0.1513) (0.2346) (0.1372) (0.1122) (0.1073) (0.1506) (0.1541)
Total Accounted for: 0.1632 0.0729 0.1618 0.1402 0.1318 0.0761 0.1081 0.0570 0.0613 -0.0181 0.0461 0.0082
(0.0424) (0.0463) (0.0218) (0.0242) (0.0161) (0.0179) (0.0141) (0.0157) 0.0128 (0.0130) (0.0153) (0.0161)
Approximation Error -0.0541 -0.0537 -0.0330 -0.0540 -0.0179 -0.0352 -0.0072 -0.0195 -0.0014 0.0309 0.0039 0.0231
(0.0171) (0.0242) (0.0106) (0.0140) (0.0080) (0.0100) (0.0064) (0.0085) (0.0049) (0.0052) (0.0052) (0.0064)
Notes. The contribution of the covariates to the composition effects is computed using the coefficients estimated with the RIF regression
who never worked, as well as deceased/absent fathers. 
(s.e.)
methodology of Firpo et al., 2007. See text for details. *Other covariates contributing to the composition effects but not shown here are
one-digit industries and occupations as well as year effects. Occupation effects for father are relative to laborers, service workers, those
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Table 4. Wage Effect of Being in a Performance Pay Job: PSID 1976-1998
Blacks Whites
              OLS 0.0048 0.1015
(0.0367) (0.0167)
              Fixed-effects 0.0132 0.0455
(0.0419) (0.0149)
Number of Observations 6928 18330
Standard errors in parentheses. The estimates represent the impact of being
in a performance pay job controlling for the same set of covariates as those
in Table 3.
Table 5. Wage Effect of Being in a Performance Pay Job by Quantile: PSID 1976-1998
Blacks Whites
Without Family With Family Without Family With Family
Background Background Background Background
Quantile
0.25 -0.0165 -0.0140 0.0662 0.0697
(0.0125) (0.0110) (0.0068) (0.0078)
0.50 -0.0100 -0.0117 0.0820 0.0760
(0.0150) (0.0175) (0.0074) (0.0069)
0.75 0.0162 0.0381 0.0914 0.0913
(0.0163) (0.0160) (0.0073) (0.0083)
0.85 0.0625 0.0740 0.1007 0.1154
(0.0230) (0.0164) (0.0107) (0.0102)
0.90 0.0580 0.0883 0.1060 0.1144
(0.0227) (0.0249) (0.0128) (0.0101)
0.95 0.0830 0.1034 0.1169 0.1165
(0.0317) (0.0306) (0.0013) (0.0163)
Number of Observations 6928 18330
Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses. Estimates represent the impact of being in a performance pay job
controlling for the same set of covariates as those in Table 3. Family background variables include dummies
for the father's educational attainment, the mother's educational attainment, and the occupation of the father. 
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Table 6. Variance Component Models by Sectors
Subsample of workers who worked in both the public and the private sector
Panel A: Blacks
Private Sector Public Sector
Parameter [1] [2]
Variance of Worker 0.054 0.062 
(0.002) (0.003)
P-Value of Equality of 0.017 
Variance of 0.123 0.099 
idiosyncratic error 0.005 (0.007)
# Workers 330 330
# Cross-Products 15103 6628
Panel B: Whites
Private Sector Public Sector
Parameter [1] [2]
Variance of Worker 0.084 0.068 
(0.002) (0.002)
P-Value of Equality of 0.000 
Variance of 0.096 0.073 
idiosyncratic error (0.004) (0.006)
# Workers 501 501
# Cross-Products 24768 13007
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.  These equally weighted covariance structure models are
fit to the cross-products of the residuals of an OLS regression of log wages on the same set of
covariates described in Table 3. 
Component (2

)
2
 
 across job types
Component (2

)
2
 
 across sectors
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